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LOADING SOFTWARE ITO RAM CREATES A "COPY'
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct.
671, 62 U.S.L.W. 3473, 1994 U.S. Lexis 937 (1994).
Brian J. Murphyt
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc.' notably held that loading
software into a computer's random access memory ("RAM") creates a
copy under section 101 of the Copyright Act.2 Although the court
acknowledged that it had no "specific" authority for-this proposition
and that those authorities cited were "somewhat troubling," the court
took its conclusion to be "generally accepted." 3
MAI Systems Corporation (MAI) previously manufactured com-
puters and designed accompanying software, and remains in business
providing supplies and service, including maintenance and'training,
for thousands of active users of their machines.4 It is estimated that
the global market for such service and maintenance "produces reve-
nues in excess of $50 million dollars per year."5 MAI's customer ser-
vice business is critical to its survival, providing both profits and the
capital necessary to maintain a field staff and updated software.6
MAI's copyrighted software includes both diagnostic and operat-
ing system software-each containing MAI trade secrets. Their com-
puter systems are considered unique in the business because MAI
Copyright © 1994 Brian J. Murphy.
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1. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994) [hereinafter MAI
Systems II].
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
3. MAI Systems If, 991 F.2d at 519.
4. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21829 at *3 (D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1992) [hereinafter MAI Systems I].
5. Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 161 B.R. 771,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 1993).
6. MAI Systems 1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829, at *7.
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"parts and operating system software do not work in other manufac-
turers' minicomputers."7 Significantly, MAI's practice is to license,
rather than sell, this software to its customers.' The software licensing
agreements expressly restrict access to the software to the customers'
employees, MAI representatives or others authorized by MAI; and
also contemplate termination of the agreement for unauthorized ac-
cess.9 By the terms of the agreements, such unauthorized use subjects
both the customer and the third party to copyright infringement liabil-
ity 10 This conclusion comports with section 117 of the Copyright
Act, which accords copyright protection exclusively to "owners," and
not to mere licensees like MAI's customers."
Peak Computer Inc. (Peak) provides routine maintenance and
emergency repairs on computers in the southern California area.1 2
Over one hundred of Peak's clients, accounting for fifty to seventy
percent of their business, require service on MAI computers.13 Spe-
cial training or skill in the maintenance and service of MAI computers
and an inventory of MAI parts are typically required for a company to
service customers with the unique MAI systems.1 4 In the course of
this maintenance, Peak must operate their customers' MAI computers
and MAI software."
In 1991, several MAI employees, including customer service
manager Eric Francis, left their positions to work for Peak, and a
number of MAI customers switched to Peak upon learning of the
move. 6 Francis, in particular, entered into several agreements during
his employment with MAI in which he agreed to keep MAI trade
secrets and proprietary information confidential, to refrain from solic-
iting MAI's employees, and to neither solicit MAI customers nor pro-
vide services competitive with MAI within one year after his
termination from MAI. 7
7. Advanced Computer Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *3.
8. MAI Systems 1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *4.
9. MA1 Systems I, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *4 n.2. The licenses also provide that
any attempt of the customer to license or sublicense or otherwise transfer the software to others
immediately terminates its license. Accordingly, when a customer attempts to have a third party
maintenance organization such as Peak service the software without first obtaining the permis-
sion of MAI, the license terminates, leaving both the customer and any third party user of the
system other than the copyright owner in the position of being infringers. Id.
10. Id.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
12. MAI Systems 11, 991 F.2d at 513.
13. Id.
14. Advanced Computer Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *3.
15. MAI Systems 11, 991 F.2d at 513.
16. Id.
17. MAI Systems !, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *9.
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In 1992, MAI filed suit against Peak, its president, and Francis
alleging copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, false
advertising and unfair competition stemming from Peak's mainte-
nance activities and Francis's move."8 This appeal concerns consoli-
dated issues arising from preliminary and permanent injunctions
granted and stayed during the district and appellate court processes. 19
II. COPYRIGHT INFRiNGEmENT
The district court issued a permanent injunction against Peak for
alleged copyright infringement stemming from "(1) Peak's running of
MAI software licenced [sic] to Peak customers; (2) Peak's use of unli-
censed software at its headquarters; and, (3) Peak's loaning of MAI
computers and software to it customers."20 The Ninth Circuit re-
viewed each claim independently.
A. Peak's Running of MAI Software Licensed to Peak's
Customers
As to the first, and most important, claim for copyright infringe-
ment, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that a plaintiff must prove
both ownership of a copyright and a" 'copying of protectable expres-
sion' beyond the scope of a license."'" MAI's copyright was undis-
puted, and the court held that any copying done by Peak was outside
the scope of MAI customers' software licenses that, as noted above,
expressly prohibit unauthorized third party access.2'
Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines "copies" as "ma-
terial objects.., in which a work is fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
device."'  A work is statutorily "fixed in a tangible medium of ex-
18. Id at *29.
19. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Peak, prohibiting them vari-
ously from infringing MAI copyrights, misappropriating MAI trade secrets, soliciting MAI cus-
tomers, and maintaining MAI computers. In turn, the Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary
injunction insofar as it prohibited Peak from maintaining MAI computers, but refused to stay the
district court proceedings. The district court subsequently granted a partial summary judgment
and entered a permanent injunction on the copyright infringement and trade secret misappropria-
tion causes of action. The Ninth Circuit then stayed the permanent injunction, and consolidated
appeals of both the preliminary injunction and portions of the permanent injunction relating to
trademark infringement and false advertising-the latter consolidated appeals are reviewed in
the instant action. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 513-16.
20. MAI Systems 11, 991 F.2d at 517.
21. Id (quoting S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989)).
22. MAI Systems I, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *4.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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pression when its embodiment in a copy[,] ... by or under the author-
ity of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated."24 Although Peak
first attempted to argue that MAI software was not used in the process
of Peak's maintenance, the district court observed that Francis admit-
ted that the operating system was necessary in this process and that the
diagnostic software was used by Peak.' The Ninth Circuit found that
Peak needed to "turn on" their customers' MAI computers, which in
turn loaded the operating system into the computer's RAM, to deter-
mine whether the system was functional and to view the system's er-
ror log.26" The error log, which is part of the operating system,
chronicles the activities of the computer and thus is a useful resource
in diagnosing the system's defects.
Peak vigorously insisted that loading of the copyrighted software
into RAM does not create a copy that is fixed. However, the court
found "no specific facts" which demonstrate that the copy created in
the RAM is not fixed.27 Although it located "no case specifically
hold[ing] that the copying of software into RAM creates a 'copy'
under the Copyright Act," the court held that it is "generally accepted"
that loading software into RAM creates a copy under the Copyright
Act.28 The court cited as its authority Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd.,29 Nimmer on Copyright30 and the CONTU report,3 but distinctly
acknowledged that these sources "do not specify that a copy is created
regardless of whether the software is loaded into the RAM, the hard
disk or the read only memory ('ROM'). ' 3 Nonetheless, the court
held that, because the copy created in RAM can be "perceived, repro-
duced or otherwise communicated," the loading of software into RAM
creates a "copy" under section 101 of the Copyright Act.33
24. Id
25. MAI Systems I, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *22 n.6.
26. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 518.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 519.
29. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) ("the act of loading a program from a medium of storage
into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program").
30. "Inputting a computer program entails the preparation of a copy." 2 NIMmEa, NtaMaR
ON COPYMRGHT § 8.08 at 8-105 (1983).
31. "IThe placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a copy." FRNA. RE-
PORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIssrON ON THE NEw TwOHLOGICAL UsEs OF Copmaotrrm
WoRKs, H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 13 (1978).
32. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 519.
33. d.
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B. Peak's Use of Unlicensed Software at its Headquarters
The district court, in its findings of fact, noted that, Peak has
"'half a dozen' operating MAI computers," although it had only ac-
quired a license to operate one of them.34 The district court granted,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, a summary judgment in favor of MAI
for copyright infringement for Peak's unauthorized use; and the Ninth
Circuit likewise affirmed the lower court's issuance of a permanent
injunction on this issue.351
C. Peak's Loaning of MAI Computers and Software to its
Customers
MAI asserted numerous causes of action for copyright infringe-
ment derived from allegedly misleading, inaccurate and infringing in-
formation contained in various Peak advertising brochures.36 MAI
contends that Peak illegally loaned out MAI computers'to its custom-
ers in accordance with their advertisements, which described the avail-
ability of loaner computers. 37 Although Peak's president admitted
that MAI computers were among those available for loan, it was never
proven that MAI computers were ever actually loaned out.38 Never-
theless, the appeals court affirmed the permanent injunction issued by
the district court because there was a real threat of future violations.39
III. MISAPPROPRiATION OF TRADE SECRETS
MAI also asserted a, cause of action for misappropriation of its
trade secrets in connection with "(1) MAI customer database; (2) MAI
Field Information Bulletins ('FI3s'); and, (3) MAI software."'4 The
lower court granted a summary judgment in favor of MAI and issued
an injunction on all of the trade secret claims.41 The Ninth Circuit
reviewed the merits of each claim separately.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that MAI's customer database was
protectable as a trade secret,42 as defined in the Uniform Trade Secret
Act which has been adopted in California.4 3 The court opined that the
34. MAI Systems 1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *19-20 (quoting deposition testimony
of Vincent Chiechi, named defendant and president of Peak).
35. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 519.
36. MAI Systems 1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *20.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *21.
39. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 520.
40. Id
41. MAI Systems 1, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 at *52.
42. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 520.
43. CAL. CIV. CoDE §§ 3426-3426.11 (West Supp. 1994).
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database has the requisite "potential economic value" because it per-
mits a competitor to identify and target customers already using MAI
systems." The court also found that MAI took the necessary steps to
conceal this information.4' The database was held to be misappropri-
ated, even though former MAI manager Francis may not have physi-
cally taken any portion of the list to Peak, because Francis improperly
solicited MAI customers by paying them personal visits in an attempt
to persuade them to switch over to Peak.46
Although the Ninth Circuit found that the FIBs were protectable
as trade secrets, it recognized a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Peak ever used any of the FIBs.47 As a consequence, the
appeals court reversed the district court's summary judgment on this
particular claim and vacated that portion of the permanent injunc-
tion.48 Likewise, the appeals court held that, while computer software
can qualify as a trade secret, MAI never specifically identified the
trade secrets existing in the software.49 The appeals court similarly
reversed the summary judgment and vacated the permanent injunction
to the extent to which they addressed the issue of trade secret misap-
propriation of the software. 0
IV. BREACH OF CoNTRACr AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for Francis's breach of his contractual obligations to
MAI.51 Furthermore, the district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against Peak for trademark infringement in response to Peak's
advertisements. 2 These ads implied that Peak was a licensed MAI
dealer and that Peak's activities were approved by MAI." Peak con-
tended in its appeal that the lower court erred in granting the prelimi-
nary injunction because it neglected to consider the factors enunciated
in relevant case law in its decision that a "likelihood of confusion"
existed. 4 The Ninth Circuit decided that the lower court did not
44. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 521.
45. I.
46. Id. at 521-22.
47. Id at 522.
48. Id.
49. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 522 (to sustain a trade secret misappropriation cause of
action, a plaintiff "must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they
exist").
50. Id at 522-23.
51. Id at 523.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. MAI Systems II, 991 F.2d at 523.
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abuse its discretion by failing to analyze each particular factor because
a preliminary injunction determination is necessarily not a full hear-
ing.5 Finally, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court's grant of
a preliminary injunction in MAI's favor for false advertising was sup-
ported by the record and that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion.5 6
VI. EPILOGUE
Not surprisingly, this Ninth Circuit decision has spawned more
litigation. In April 1993, MAI filed a petition for bankruptcy and re-
organization under Chapter 11 in Delaware Bankruptcy Court.5
7
Some time also in April 1993, MAI allegedly sent out numerous
"cease and desist" letters to a group of companies who, like Peak,
compete with MAI for the business of servicing customers with MAI
systems.58 Specifically, these letters mentioned MAI's victory in the
Ninth Circuit and demanded that the companies cease and desist from
"any activity involving copying of MAI's operating system software,
including 'loading' or 'booting' the software."'59
In subsequent months, these companies filed a copyright and
anti-trust action against MAI in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.60 Plaintiffs in the Virginia district court
action allege that MAI is engaged in "a plan to restrict competition in
the market for ... [such] maintenance ... by refusing to authorize
plaintiffs and other service organizations to load and use the MAI op-
erating system software in connection with servicing or repairing MAI
computers.' In particular, plaintiffs contend that MAI is tying the
sale of its copyrighted operating system software to the sale and main-
tenance services in contravention of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.62 The Delaware bankruptcy court annulled the automatic stay of
proceedings which otherwise would have precluded this action, and
the Virginia district court is now proceeding on the merits of these
55. Id.
56. Id
57. See Advanced Computer Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *2.
58. Id at *5.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *4, *5.
62. Advanced Computer Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *2-*3, *6. A number of
recent decisions have addressed this issue of tying in the intellectual property arena. See Service
& Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992); Virtual Maintenance, Inc.
v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318 (6th Cir.) vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992);
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd 112 S.
Ct. 2072 (1992).
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causes of action against MAI.6' Relying in part on the Ninth Circuit's
decision, the Virginia district court held that MAI had established di-
rect infringement by the plaintiffs' loading of MAI software into
RAM.' a Interestingly, the district court also sustained MAI's motion
for summary judgment on the tying claim, primarily because plaintiffs
could not demonstrate that "the licensing of MAI software was ex-
pressly or implicitly conditioned upon the purchase of MAI computer
equipment servicing"-a necessary element of a tying claim.65
In review, these disputes have all arisen due to MA's practice of
licensing, rather than selling, its software to its customers. When in-
dependent service organizations attempted to service MAI machines
they inevitably loaded MAI. software, creating a copy of the copy-
righted software, and subjecting them to infringement liability. This
decision comports with public policy whereby MAI should be allowed
to license its software to whomever it chooses. This is true even if this
policy dissuades buyers of MAI systems because their maintenance
choices are limited since, in effect, MAI is only restricting its own
potential market.
63. Advanced Computer Services, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17985 at *15.
64. Id. at "14-*23.
65. Id. at *41.
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